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The one-state machine that always defects is the only evolutionarily stable strategy
in the machine game that is derived from the prisoners’ dilemma, when preferences
are lexicographic in complexity. This machine is the only stochastically stable strat-
egy of the machine game when players are restricted to choosing machines with a
uniformly bounded complexity. Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Num-
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1. INTRODUCTION
The prisoner’s dilemma is hardly a game. It consists of two independent,
one-person decision problems, each with one clear solution. That is why it
has a unique equilibrium. When the prisoner’s dilemma is repeated a ﬁnite
number of times, the resulting game no longer has an equilibrium in domi-
nant strategies but the unique equilibrium outcome still consists of mutual
defection at every stage. Only when the prisoner’s dilemma is repeated
inﬁnitely many times can we ﬁnd several equilibrium outcomes. Eternal
mutual defection, however, is still an equilibrium outcome. Abreu and
Rubinstein (1988) consider a two-player game—the machine game intro-
duced in Rubinstein (1986)—where players choose a ﬁnite automaton that
implements an inﬁnitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game strategy and
where a pair of strategies is evaluated lexicographically ﬁrst according to
the limit of the means of the stream of one-shot payoffs and second accord-
ing to the complexity of the machines. Abreu and Rubinstein (1988) show
that the set of equilibrium outcomes of the machine game is much smaller
than the set of equilibrium outcomes in the repeated game, but still the pair




 2002 Elsevier Science (USA)
All rights reserved.310 oscar volij
of automata that defect at every stage independently of history is an equi-
librium. Fundenberg and Maskin (1990) apply the concept of evolutionary
stability to a noisy version of the machine game and succeed in obtaining
the cooperative payoff as the unique equilibrium outcome, provided players
are endowed with lexicographic beliefs about mistakes.
In an interesting and thought provoking paper, Binmore and Samuelson
(1992) introduced a solution concept for the Abreu and Rubinstein (1988)
machine game that prevents eternal defection from being an equilibrium
outcome. Moreover, in any such equilibrium the automata cooperate at
almost every stage. The novel concept, which is called modiﬁed evolutionar-
ily stable strategy (MESS), has an evolutionary ﬂavor. It intends to capture
the same idea as the one behind the standard concept of evolutionarily stable
strategies (ESS): an action is evolutionarily stable if a population composed
of individuals who use that action is immune to invasion by a sufﬁciently
small group of mutants. The difference between the two concepts lies in
the importance they assign to complexity considerations for the chances of
a population to be invaded. While the ESS concept takes into account the
machine game’s payoff function in the requirements for stability, the MESS
concept ﬁrst takes the stream of one shot payoffs and then, lexicograph-
ically, the complexity of the machines. This difference derives from the
different preferences over lotteries that underlie the two concepts. While
the formal deﬁnition of the machine game analyzed in Rubinstein (1986),
Abreu and Rubinstein (1988), and Binmore and Samuelson (1992) does not
require any speciﬁcation of preferences over lotteries, the applications of
both ESS and MESS do. This speciﬁcation is necessary for the evaluation
of automata facing a mixed population. Under ESS, preferences have the
expected utility form, while under MESS preferences ﬁrst take into account
the expected mean payoff and then, lexicographically, the complexity of the
machines.
Our ﬁrst result is that the only machine that satisﬁes the standard ESS
requirements in the machine game with preferences that are lexicographic
in the limit of the means and in complexity is the one-state machine that
defects forever, also known as DEFECT. That is, not only is there a unique
evolutionary stable outcome, but also a unique strategy that leads to that
outcome.
Cooper (1996) shows that when complexity costs do not enter lexico-
graphically in the payoff function, Binmore and Samuelson’s result also
changes dramatically. Speciﬁcally, he shows that any convex combination
of the symmetric efﬁcient payoff and the Nash equilibrium payoff can
be approximately achieved by a neutrally stable strategy (NSS) if a posi-
tive and small enough cost of complexity is allowed. Cooper (1996) argues
that the striking difference in the number of equilibrium outcomes is due
to the fact that complexity costs are positive. In contrast, we argue thatin defense of defect 311
it is the solution concept employed, and not the cost technology, which
explains the difference in the results. If one applies the standard ESS, with
or without lexicographic costs of complexity, to the machine game, one
gets DEFECT as the unique evolutionary stable strategy. Similarly, pro-
ceeding as in Cooper (1996), if one applies standard NSS to the machine
game, with or without lexicographic costs, one obtains a folk theorem. The
difference between Cooper’s NSS and Binmore and Samuelson’s solution
concept is that the former assumes that risk preferences have the expected
utility form, while the latter assumes nonexpected utility preferences.
ESS is not the only solution concept that has an evolutionary idea behind
it. Foster and Young (1990) developed the concept of stochastic stability
which requires a population to be immune to persistent random mutations.
This concept has been successfully applied by Kandori et al. (1993) in the
analysis of symmetric 2 × 2 games, by Young (1993a) for weakly acyclic n
person games, by Young (1993b) in the analysis of bargaining, by Vega-
Redondo (1997) in the analysis of competition among ﬁrms, and recently
by Ben-Shoham et al. (2000) in the analysis of a housing problem. The
idea of stochastic stability is to add a small perturbation to the evolution-
ary dynamics on some game and select all those actions that are assigned
positive probability by the limit of the long-run distribution when the per-
turbation becomes arbitrarily small. It turns out that the stochastically stable
actions are contained in the set of actions that are in the recurrent classes
of the unperturbed process. When we apply the concept of stochastic sta-
bility to the machine games where the players are constrained to choose
among automata with complexity that does not exceed some ﬁxed number,
the only stochastically stable machine is DEFECT.
Bergin and Lipman (1996) pointed out a weakness of the concept of
stochastic stability: the actions selected out of the recurrent classes depend
on the rate of mutation. More speciﬁcally, they show that any invariant
distribution of the unperturbed process is the limit of some sequence of
perturbed processes. In our model, however, the only recurrent class of
the unperturbed process consists of the one-state automaton that defects
forever. Consequently, DEFECT is the only stochastically stable machine
for any model of mutations.
2. BASIC DEFINITIONS
A symmetric two-player game is a pair  A u  where A is the common
set of actions and u  A2 →  is the players’ common utility function that
assigns to each pair of actions, one for the player and the other for his
opponent, a utility level. The prisoner’s dilemma is the game G =  A u 312 oscar volij





D δ β ,
where γ<β<α<δ .
A Nash equilibrium of a two-player game  A u  is a pair of actions
 s t ∈A2 such that for all r ∈ A, u s t ≥u r  t  and u t s ≥u r  s .
A Nash equilibrium  s t  is strict if the above inequalities are strict for all
r different from s and t, respectively.
Now, we turn to the machine game ﬁrst analyzed by Rubinstein (1986). A
ﬁnite automaton that can play the repeated prisoners’ dilemma is a quadru-
ple  Q  q0 λ µ  where
• Q is a ﬁnite set of states,
• q0 is the initial state of the machine,
• λ  Q → A is the output function, which returns an action chosen as
a function of the state, and
• µ  Q × A → Q is the transition function that returns the next state
of the machine as a function of the present state and of the action chosen
by the opponent.
Each machine represents a repeated game strategy but there are some
repeated game strategies that cannot be represented by a ﬁnite automa-
ton. One famous automaton is DEFECT, which consists of a single state at
which it returns the action D. Another one is COOPERATE, which con-
sists of a single state at which it cooperates. When two automata meet and
play against each other, they determine a play in the repeated game. For-
mally, let a1 =  Q1 q 0
1 λ 1 µ 1  and a2 =  Q2 q 0
2 λ 2 µ 2  be two automata.
The evolution of the machines’ states when they play against each other is
deﬁned recursively as
q0 =  q0
1 q 0
2 
and for t>0a s
qt+1 =  µ1 qt
1 λ 2 qt
2   µ 2 qt
2 λ 1 qt
1   
Similarly, the evolution of play when the machines play against each other
is given by
h0 =  λ1 q0
1  λ 2 q0
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and for t>0by
ht+1 =  λ1 qt
1  λ 2 qt
2   
We are interested in the game where players choose a ﬁnite automaton
and where a pair of automata are evaluated lexicographically, ﬁrst according
to the limit of the means criterion and second according to the complexity
of the machine. More formally, let  be the set of ﬁnite automata. The
complexity of an automaton a ∈  is deﬁned to be the number of its states
and denoted by  a . Given two automata a1 =  Q1 q 0
1 λ 1 µ 1  and a2 =
 Q2 q 0




t=0 u ht  be the limit of the
means of the stream of payoffs generated when they play each other.1 A
machine game is a symmetric game   U  where U is a payoff function
that satisﬁes
U a b  >U c d ⇔

P a b  >P  c d  or
P a b =P c d  and |a| < |c|.
In what follows we ﬁx an arbitrary machine game   U  and denote it
G . All the results in the paper are independent of the particular choice of
representation U.
The following lemma, taken from Abreu and Rubinstein (1988), is the
basis of all the results that follow. Since the result is so useful and its proof
is so short, I provide it here.
Lemma 1 (Abreu and Rubinstein, 1988). For any machine a ∈ , there
is a machine b ∈  such that  b =  a  and P b  a ≥P c a  for all c ∈ .
Proof. Given automaton a =  Q  q0 λ µ , the choice of a sequence of
one-shot actions that maximizes the limit of the means of the resulting
sequence of one-shot payoffs is a Markov decision problem that has a sta-
tionary solution s  Q → A (see Puterman, 1994, Theorem 8.4.5). Consider
b =  Q  q0 s µ b , where µb is chosen so that µb q  λ q   = µ q  s q  
for all q ∈ Q, while it is unrestricted otherwise. Automaton b satisﬁes the
requirements of the lemma.
Remark 1. It follows from the proof of Lemma 1 that if the automaton
a has more than one state, then the automaton b identiﬁed in Lemma 1 is
not unique. (To see this, note that if a has more than one state, there are
several ways to choose a transition function µb that satisﬁes µb q  λ q   =
µ q  s q  ). Therefore, if b is a best reply to a such that  b =  a  > 1, then
b is not the unique best reply to a. Further, one of the best replies can
be chosen so that its transition function is independent of the opponent’s
action.
1Since we are dealing with ﬁnite automata this limit exists, and hence P a1 a 2  is well-
deﬁned.314 oscar volij
3. EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY
The ﬁrst solution concept we want to apply is evolutionary stability.
Deﬁnition 1 (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973). Let  A u  be a sym-
metric two-player game. An action s ∈ A is an evolutionarily stable strategy
(ESS) if for all t ∈ A, t  = s, we have either
1. u s s  >u  t s  or
2. u s s =u t s  and u s t  >u  t t .
Implicit in the above deﬁnition of evolutionary stability is the assump-
tion that u is a von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function. In particular,
when opposed to a population mixture  1 −   x +  y, action s is preferred
to action t if and only if  1−  u s x + u s y  >  1−  u t x + u t y .
Therefore, although probability mixtures are not present in the above def-
inition, one should bear in mind that preferences over lotteries have the
expected utility form.
There is a problem with the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy:
an action may not be ESS just because it can be invaded by an essentially
equivalent action. To see this, consider the following game:
The opponent
s1 s2 s3
One player s1 3 3 0
s2 3 3 1
s3 1 0 2
This game has a unique ESS, s3, which is its only strict Nash equilibrium.
The reason s1 is not an ESS is that it can be invaded by s2. Similarly, s2
is not an ESS because it can be invaded by s1. But s1 and s2 are indistin-
guishable in a population composed solely of elements of  s1 s 2 . There is
a sense in which the set  s1 s 2  is evolutionarily stable. If the population
is composed only of elements of  s1 s 2 , in whatever proportion, strategy
s3 cannot invade. There will be drift, but the population will remain com-
posed of s1 and s2 alone. In order to develop this idea, we need to extend
the deﬁnition of an evolutionarily stable strategy so as to allow for evo-
lutionarily stable sets of strategies: we say that B ⊆ A is an evolutionarily
stable family of strategies (ESF) if for all s t ∈ B and for all r ∈ A \ B we
have
• u s s =u s t =u t s =u t t  and
• 1. u s s  >u  r  s  or
2. u s s =u r  s  and u s r  >u  r  r .in defense of defect 315
Note that if s is an evolutionarily stable strategy, then  s  is an ESF. Also,
if s belongs to an ESF then  s s  is a Nash equilibrium. This deﬁnition
captures the idea that any population composed of elements of an ESF, B,
will be able to reject any attempt of invasion by any mutant outside B and
only by a mutant outside B.
We are now ready to state the following.
Claim 1. The only evolutionarily stable strategy of G  is DEFECT. Fur-
ther,  DEFECT  is the only evolutionarily stable family of G .
Proof. Since  D  D  is a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot prisoners’
dilemma G, it follows that P DEFECT DEFECT ≥P b  DEFECT  for
all automata b ∈ . The fact that DEFECT is an ESS follows from the
observation that the only one-state machine that performs against DEFECT
as well as DEFECT is DEFECT itself. To see that there is no other ESF
than  DEFECT , note ﬁrst that COOPERATE cannot belong to an ESF
because (COOPERATE, COOPERATE) is not a Nash equilibrium. Let
a =  Q  q0 λ µ  be an automaton with at least two states and assume
by contradiction that it belongs to an ESF, denoted by B. Consider the
automaton b =  Q  q0 λ µ b  where µb q  C =µb q  D =µ q  λ q  
for all q ∈ Q. By construction, U a a =U a b =U b  a =U b  b .
Therefore, since a belongs to B, so does b. Since b’s transition function is
independent of the opponent’s action, DEFECT is a best response to b.
That is, U DEFECT b ≥U b  b . But since  DEFECT  <  b , we have
U DEFECT b  >U b  b  which contradicts the fact that b ∈ B.
No Nash equilibrium of the machine game, except for DEFECT, is evo-
lutionarily stable.2 The reason is that if a is an automaton with at least two
states that is part of a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the machine game,
there is another automaton, b, with the same number of states, which, when
matched with a, behaves identically to a. Automata a and b differ only in
their “out of equilibrium” behavior. Claim 1 shows, however, that a and b
cannot co-exist even in an evolutionarily stable polymorphic population.
4. COMPARISON WITH MESS
In this section we compare the concept of ESS with an alternative solu-
tion concept, proposed by Binmore and Samuelson (1992). To facilitate the
comparison, we apply the deﬁnition of ESS to the machine game and get
the following observation, the proof of which is left to the reader.
2Claim 1 seems to contradict some statements in the literature; see Binmore and Samuelson
(1992, pp. 282 and 287) and Fudenberg (1992, endnote 39). We comment on the Binmore–
Samuelson approach in Section 4.316 oscar volij
Observation 1. Automaton a ∈  is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)
of the machine game G  if, and only if, for all b ∈ , b  = a, we have
1. P a a  >P  b  a ,o r
2. P a a =P b  a  and  a  <  b ,o r
3. P a a =P b  a  and  a =  b  and P a b  >P  b  b .
The alternative solution concept is deﬁned as follows.3
Deﬁnition 2. Automaton a ∈  is an ESS∗ of the machine game G  if,
and only if, for all b ∈ , b  = a, we have
1. P a a  >P  b  a ,o r
2∗. P a a =P b  a  and P a b  >P  b  b ,o r
3∗. P a a =P b  a  and P a b =P b  b  and  a  <  b .
Note that the requirements in Observation 4 differ from Binmore and
Samuelson’s ESS∗. Loosely speaking, ESS∗ is ESS applied to P rather
than U with an extra line, (3∗), that applies when P a a =P b  a  and
P a b =P b  b  and in which complexity matters. The reader may ﬁnd the
following alternative way to state the above deﬁnitions suggestive: Automa-
ton a is ESS if there is an ¯   ∈  0 1  such that for all   ∈  0  ¯    and for all
b  = a,
 1 −   U a a + U a b  >  1 −   U b  a + U b  b  
while automaton a is ESS∗ if there is ¯   ∈  0 1  such that for all   ∈  0  ¯   
and for all b  = a
1.  1 −   P a a + P a b  >  1 −   P b  a + P b  b  or
2.  1−  P a a + P a b =  1−  P b  a + P b  b and a  <  b .
One can see that ESS takes stock of the expected utility obtained by each
automaton facing a mixed population. That is, the expectation is taken
over the utilities derived from each possible match. The concept of ESS∗,
on the other hand, lexicographically considers ﬁrst the expected mean stage
payoff and then complexity. In other words, the implicit assumption behind
the deﬁnition of ESS∗ is that when opposed to a population mixture
 1 −   x +  y, automaton a is preferred to automaton b if and only if
1.  1 −   P a x + P a y  >  1 −   P b  x + P b  y  or
2.  1 −   P a x + P a y =  1 −   P b  x + P b  y  and
 a  <  b .
3Binmore and Samuelson (1992) note that no automaton satisﬁes the ESS∗ requirements
when applied to G  and thus they deﬁne MESS to be a weaker version of ESS∗ where the
last inequality of 3∗ is replaced with a weak inequality. In the following, all the statements
concerning ESS∗ also apply to MESS.in defense of defect 317
FIG. 1. Two automata.
These preferences do not have the expected utility form. Consider for
instance the automata a and b in Fig. 1. Automaton a is a three-state
machine that cooperates until the opponent defects for the second time.
Once this happens, it switches to defection forever. Automaton b,o nt h e
other hand, is a two-state automaton that starts defecting and continues to
do so as long as its opponent defects. As soon as the opponent cooperates,
however, it switches to cooperation forever. One can check that P a a =
P a b =P b  a  >P  b  b . Therefore, against a population  1 −   a +  b
automaton a is preferred to automaton b, for every   ∈  0 1 . Against a
monomorphic population of a (that is, for   = 0), however, b is preferred
to a since  b  <  a . That is, the continuity axiom is violated.
This discontinuity of the ESS∗ preferences has substantial consequences.
It means that the ESS∗ solution concept is not a reﬁnement of Nash equi-
librium. To see this, consider a 2 ×2 machine selection game    U  where
the set   consists of the two automata of Fig. 1. Automaton a is an ESS∗
because for all   ∈  0 1  we have
 1 −   P a a + P a b  >  1 −   P b  a + P b  b 
(automaton a enjoys the fruits of cooperation at almost every stage while
the mutant b gets mutual defection forever with probability  ). On the
other hand,  a a  is not a Nash equilibrium of the machine game because b
is a proﬁtable deviation for any of the players. This is so because, although
P a a =P b  a , automaton b has a lower complexity than that of automa-
ton a:  b =2 < 3 =  a . This example shows that an ESS∗ need not be a
Nash equilibrium. Needless to say, it has long been proven that a standard
ESS is a Nash equilibrium.
5. STOCHASTIC STABILITY
We now turn to the concept of stochastic stability which is the sec-
ond well-established evolutionary solution concept. As opposed to the ESS
concept, it allows for distinct mutants to coexist. For each n ∈ , let
 n  be the set of automata with at most n states and let Gn be the
game Gn =   n  U . There is only one difference between the games Gn318 oscar volij
and G . In the former, players can choose only ﬁnite automata whose com-
plexity does not exceed n, while in the latter there is no bound in the com-
plexity of the allowed automata. Consequently, Gn is a ﬁnite normal form
game. Consider the following learning model. The game Gn is played by a
single population of m>2 individuals, where for simplicity m is assumed
to be even. At each period, the individuals are randomly matched in pairs
and play Gn. For each a ∈  n  let kt
a denote the number of individuals
that choose automaton a in period t. Consider a Markov process where the
state space is the set of all vectors k =  ka a∈A n  such that ka is a nonneg-
ative integer for all a ∈  n , and

a∈A n  ka = m. In other words, a state
is a list of the numbers of agents that choose any given automaton. As for
the transition function, assume that the current state is k. At the beginning
of the next period each agent draws a sample of size s<m / 2, without sam-
pling himself and without replacement, from the previous period’s actions
and plays a best reply to the resulting sample proportions. If there is more
than one best reply, each is played with equal probability.
The dynamic process just described is chosen for its simplicity. Other
dynamic processes could have been chosen without affecting the following
result.4
Claim 2. The process deﬁned above on Gn converges with probability one
to the state where all the agents choose DEFECT.
Proof. It is enough to show that the only absorbing state is the one
where all agents chose DEFECT and that there are no recurrent classes
other than the singleton containing the unique absorbing state. This is
shown in the following lemmas.
Lemma 2. The unique strict Nash equilibrium of Gn is (DEFECT,
DEFECT).
Proof. It is clear that the only best reply to DEFECT is DEFECT
so (DEFECT, DEFECT) is a strict Nash equilibrium. Let now  a b  be
a Nash equilibrium and assume that one of the automata, say b,i sn o t
DEFECT. Automaton b cannot be COOPERATE because the only best
reply to COOPERATE is DEFECT and (DEFECT, COOPERATE) is not
a Nash equilibrium. Therefore  b  > 1. By Theorem 1(a) in Abreu and
Rubinstein (1988),  a =  b  > 1. Then, Remark 1 tells us that there are
more than one best reply to a, which means that  a b  is not strict.
Lemma 3. The only absorbing state of this process is the state where all
individuals play DEFECT.
4See Cooper (1993) for a similar result.in defense of defect 319
Proof. Since (DEFECT, DEFECT) is a strict Nash equilibrium, the state
where all the individuals play DEFECT is an absorbing state. Now let
k =  ka a∈ n  be an absorbing state and let a be an automaton such that
ka ≥ 1. This means that at every period there is an agent that chooses a.
It must be the case that a is this agent’s only best reply to every sample he
can possibly pick because, otherwise, there would be a positive probability
that the process passes from k to some other state k  with k 
a <k a. Assume
now there are two automata, a1 and a2 with ka1 ≥ 1 and ka2 ≥ 1. Then, by
the previous argument, there are two agents such that a1 is the only best
reply to every possible sample of the ﬁrst agent and a2 is the only best reply
to every possible sample of the second agent. But since the sample size is
less than m/2, there must be a sample that both agents can simultaneously
pick, which implies that a1 = a2. Therefore, at k, every agent chooses the
same automaton a. Consequently,  a a  must be a strict Nash equilibrium
for otherwise there would be a positive probability that the system moves
from k to some state other than k. But, by Lemma 2, a = DEFECT.
Lemma 4. There is a positive probability that the system reaches the only
absorbing state in a ﬁnite number of stages, independently of the initial state.
Proof. Let k0 be the current state. Since s<m / 2, there is a positive
probability that half the population picks a common sample and the other
half picks another common sample. Consequently, there is a positive prob-
ability that next period all agents sample the same distribution of automata,
and since all best replies have positive probability there is a positive prob-
ability that all m agents choose the same automaton. If this automaton
is DEFECT, we are done. If this automaton is COOPERATE, then next
period everybody will choose DEFECT and we are done again. So assume
that the state is one in which every agent chooses the same automaton a,
with  a  > 1. Let  an ∞
n=1 be a sequence of automata such that a1 = a and,
for all n>1, an is a best reply to an−1. It follows from Lemma 1 that
the sequence   an  ∞
n=1 of the corresponding complexities is a nonincreas-
ing sequence of positive integers. Consequently, there is an N ∈  such
that the sequence in  an ∞
n=1 consists of automata that have the same com-
plexity from N on. This constant complexity is  aN . By the deﬁnition of
the process there is a positive probability that the process follows the path
 a1     a N  where at t periods after the current state all agents choose at.
If  aN =1 then we are done because from the next period on all the agents
will choose DEFECT. If  aN  > 1 then  aN =  aN+1  > 1 and by Remark 1
there is an automaton a∗ with  a∗ =  aN  that is a best reply to aN and
whose transition function is independent of the action of its opponent (it
depends only on its own present state). Since the number of best replies
to a given automaton is ﬁnite, there is a positive probability that the sys-
tem moves to a state where all the agents choose automaton a∗. But then,320 oscar volij
since the only best reply to an automaton with a transition function that is
insensitive to the opponent’s actions is DEFECT, from the next period on
all the agents will play DEFECT. This shows that from any state there is a
positive probability to reach the only absorbing state of the process which
implies that this state constitutes its only recurrent class.
The uniform bound on complexity is necessary for the above proof to
work. To see this, note that a best reply to a given sample could be an
automaton of complexity higher than the complexity of any automaton in
the sample. Therefore, if all ﬁnite automata are available we cannot pre-
clude the case where the system visits an inﬁnite amount of different states.
Consequently, without the bound on complexity Lemma 4 does not imply
that the process converges to the unique absorbing state with probability
one. Lemma 1 assures, however, that all best replies to any sample of size
1 have a complexity which is no higher than the complexity of the sam-
pled automaton. As a result, if we restrict the agents to take samples of
size 1, the corresponding process will visit a ﬁnite number of states. This
observation, together with the proof of Claim 2, shows the following.
Claim 3. When the sample size is restricted to be 1, the process deﬁned
above on G  converges with probability one to the state where all the agents
choose DEFECT.
6. CONCLUSION
We have shown that two well-established solution concepts of evolution-
ary game theory—standard evolutionarily stable strategies and stochastic
stability—have a very strong selection power when applied to the repeated
prisoner’s dilemma machine game. Not only do they point to a unique equi-
librium outcome, but they also select a unique strategy—the never fully
appreciated one-state machine that defects forever.
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